Europe Security Report: Analyzing Potential Russian Threats
**A new report on Europe’s security landscape reveals a troubling possibility: a renewed Russian attack on the continent could be on the horizon.** Compiled by the Bruegel think tank and the Kiel Institute, the report includes assessments from NATO indicating that Moscow may be poised for offensive action within the next three to ten years. Currently, the United States maintains a troop presence of over 80,000 in Europe; however, experts warn that this number could triple in response to any aggression. Complicating matters, the fraught state of U.S.-European relations has led to concerns that Washington might reconsider its commitment to the region, particularly in light of the exclusion of European leaders from crucial negotiations regarding Ukraine.
The total strength of Europe’s national armies stands at approximately 1.5 million troops, significantly surpassing the U.S. forces on the continent. Nevertheless, should the U.S. decide to withdraw its soldiers, Europe would need to bolster its ranks by at least 300,000 troops, equating to about 50 additional battalions. Alexandr Burilkov, a key contributor to the report, highlights the potential for this increase through conscription and emphasizes the urgent need for well-trained reserve forces akin to the U.S. National Guard. Furthermore, he points out that the absence of a unified command structure within European armies necessitates significant reforms to enhance both troop numbers and the resilience of existing military units.
To effectively deter a potential Russian offensive in the Baltic states, the report outlines specific military requirements: 1,400 tanks, 2,000 armored personnel carriers, and 700 artillery systems. Additionally, a stockpile of at least one million 155mm shells is deemed essential for the initial three months of a high-intensity conflict. Alarmingly, the report notes that these requirements exceed the combined wartime capabilities of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom’s ground forces. To address this capability gap, Europe must also ramp up drone production, aiming for 2,000 long-range loitering munitions annually.
Burilkov underscores that Russia has significantly shifted its economy and society towards a war-ready posture over the past two years, leveraging the infrastructure and equipment leftover from the Soviet era. With Russia producing more than 1,500 tanks, thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds of artillery systems each year, he insists that Europe must establish a credible military deterrent to counter this evolving threat. Luigi Scazzieri from the Central European Reform Center echoes this sentiment, stressing that Europe must enhance its defense capabilities irrespective of any U.S. withdrawal. He advocates for advancements in areas such as long-range missiles, air defense systems, and aerial surveillance to ensure effective deterrence.
Scazzieri also champions the need for joint arms procurement, integration of logistics, and military unit coordination, while cautioning that these measures alone may be insufficient. He argues for the creation of a European army composed of national forces rather than a fully unified military structure. Meanwhile, defense expert Nicolas Gros-Verheyde contends that Europe should focus on deploying its existing forces more strategically rather than merely increasing troop numbers. He proposes transforming NATO’s rotational forces stationed near Russia into permanent bases, including a naval base in Constanta, Romania, and a land base in the Suwalki Corridor between Poland and Lithuania.
Additionally, Gros-Verheyde suggests that France extend its nuclear deterrent to bolster Europe’s security posture. Addressing the financial implications, the Bruegel-Kiel report calls for a significant increase in Europe’s defense budget, estimating the need for an additional €125 to €250 billion annually—representing about 3.5% of Europe’s GDP. This budgetary increase is expected to be financed through borrowing, with Germany, the second-largest contributor to NATO, required to account for at least half of this expenditure, which would necessitate raising its defense budget from €80 billion to €140 billion.
Burilkov notes that the feasibility of these plans hinges on the political will of Berlin, particularly in the aftermath of upcoming elections. The report emphasizes that while an initial increase in military spending is crucial, costs could stabilize or even decrease over time if Europe adopts a more coordinated approach to defense. By placing bulk orders for military equipment, Europe could reduce unit costs and enhance production efficiency, although initial surges in demand may lead to short-term price increases.
Ultimately, the report warns that a lack of coordination among European nations could raise costs and impede efforts to deter Russia’s military ambitions. The existing European Defense Industrial Reinforcement Program (EDIRPA) is set to transition to the European Defense Industrial Program in 2025, but the European Court of Auditors has indicated that the new agency will require a larger budget to fulfill its objectives.
